



# Effective Value-Oriented Payment Strategies

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# About CPR

An independent non-profit corporation **working to catalyze employers, public purchasers and others** to implement strategies that produce higher-value health care and improve the functioning of the health care marketplace.

- 32BJ Health Fund
- 3M
- Aircraft Gear Corp.
- Aon Hewitt
- Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (Medicaid)
- AT&T
- The Boeing Company
- CalPERS
- City and County of San Francisco
- Comcast
- Compassion International
- Covered California
- Dow Chemical Company
- Equity Healthcare
- FedEx Corporation
- GE
- General Motors Company
- Google, Inc.
- Group Insurance Commission, MA
- The Home Depot
- Mercer
- Miami University (Ohio)
- Ohio Medicaid
- Ohio PERS
- Penn State University
- Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund
- Pitney Bowes
- Qualcomm Incorporated
- Self-Insured Schools of California
- South Carolina Health & Human Services (Medicaid)
- TennCare (Medicaid)
- Unite Here Health
- US Foods
- Walmart Stores, Inc.
- Wells Fargo & Company
- Willis Towers Watson

# About CPR

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Catalyst for Payment Reform's work is governed by three core beliefs:

- **A small group of empowered purchasers can change the system**
- **Consistent signals to the market will catalyze change faster**
- **We need to track progress and hold the market accountable**

# About CPR

To achieve our goals, CPR provides the following:



## EDUCATION

Learn about  
high value  
health care  
purchasing



## TOOLS & SUPPORT

Take action  
at your  
organization



## COORDINATION

A louder  
voice in the  
marketplace



## RESEARCH & ANALYSIS

Push the  
market and  
measure  
progress

# Key Ingredients of High-Value Health Care Going Forward

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**TRANSPARENCY:** insight into quality and prices, building block for other reforms



**BENEFIT DESIGN:** incentives for consumers



**PROVIDER NETWORK DESIGN:** guidance for consumers, leverage for payers, volume for providers



**PAYMENT REFORM:** financial incentives for providers

# Local Market Dynamics Impact Value Too

In every local market there is a **unique dynamic** among purchasers, payers and providers (along with laws and regulations).





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
# Payment Reform

# CPR's Definition of Payment Reform

**Payment reform:** a range of health care payment models that use payment to promote or leverage greater value for patients, purchasers, payers, and providers.



# Spectrum of Health Care Provider Payment Methods



Performance-Based Payment or Payment Designed to Cut Waste  
(financial upside & downside depends on quality, efficiency, cost, etc.)

# Growth of Provider Payment Reform

The vast majority of reforms are layered on fee for service

2010  
1-3% of payments tied to performance

2011  
11% of payment is value oriented

2013-2015  
40+% of payment is value oriented

2016 - 2018  
50%+ ?

The level of payment reform in the market has been steadily rising

Most common reforms are pay for performance & shared savings; bundled payment is the least common

## WHAT'S NEXT?

- Fix the fee schedule
- Evaluate which reforms work
- Make smart pairings between provider payment methods and benefit designs

New payment methods support new health care delivery models such as patient centered medical homes, accountable care organizations....

# Mixed Results for Reforms: Example of ACOs

Medicare Shared Savings Program	
+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consistently high quality scores</li> <li>31% of ACOs received shared savings bonuses in 2016</li> </ul>
0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unchanged performance on a portion of quality measures</li> <li>Screening use varied</li> </ul>
-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For 2013 entrants, no early reductions in spending</li> <li>Medicare saw a net loss of \$39 million</li> </ul>

Connected Care (Intel)	
+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High patient experience and satisfaction scores</li> <li>Statistically significant improvements in diabetes care</li> </ul>
-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Total costs at year end were 3.6% higher than expected</li> </ul>

Regional Care Collaboratives (CO Medicaid)	
+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adult participants had fewer hospital readmissions and ER services than control</li> <li>Total reduction in spending est. \$20 mill to \$30 mill FY 2011-2012</li> </ul>
0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use of ER services was about the same for children enrolled and not</li> </ul>
-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ER use was higher for enrolled participants with disabilities than those not enrolled</li> </ul>

Can't say that ACOs are a slam dunk when it comes to procuring higher-value care!

# Mixed Results for Reforms: Example of Bundled Payment

## Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI)

+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>21% lower total spending per joint replacement episode without complications</li> <li>1% reduction in ER visits and readmissions</li> </ul>
0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mixed impact on quality measures – some improved, some stayed the same and some worsened</li> </ul>
-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For spinal surgery episodes, average Medicare payments increased more for the hospitalization and 90-day post-discharge period for the BPCI than comparison</li> </ul>

## Health Care Payment Improvement Initiative (Arkansas)

+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AR BCBS trend decreased for average LOS for inpatient admissions for TJR, from 2.7 days in baseline year to 2.6 days in 2013 and 2.3 days in 2014</li> <li>Medicaid 30-day wound infection rate improved to 1.7% for 2014, down from 2% in 2013</li> </ul>
-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Medicaid post-operation TJR complication rate worsened from 8% in 2013 to 14.1% in 2014</li> </ul>

## Bundles for Maternity Care (PBGH)

+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduction of cesareans by 20%</li> <li>Savings of \$5,000 per averted cesarean delivery</li> </ul>
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Bundled payments are promising, but the details matter!

# Mixed Results for Reforms: Example of Bundled Payment

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## Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund

- Pennsylvania Employees Benefit Trust Fund (PEBTF) implemented a [pilot bundled payment program](#) for total hip and knee replacements
- The program decreased outpatient costs, on average, by \$3524. However, inpatient costs remained about the same.

*"One of the lessons... is that facilities and surgeons should have distinct budgets and two-sided risk arrangements. That way quality and cost improvements stemming from one cannot obliterate the lack of improvement from the other."*

[http://prometheusanalytics.net/sites/default/files/attachments/PEBTF-Case-Study\\_0.pdf](http://prometheusanalytics.net/sites/default/files/attachments/PEBTF-Case-Study_0.pdf)


<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pennsylvania-employees-benefit-trust-fund-bundled-payment-pilot-improves-patient-outcomes-significantly-decreases-professional-services-costs-300319932.html>

# Continuing to Track Progress and Impact of Payment Reforms

## Previous Scorecards

- ✓ **National and Regional Scorecards**
  - the first to track the nation's (and certain states')
  - progress in implementing value-oriented payment.


## 2013, 2014 National Scorecards



## CA 2013, 2014



## 2015 FFS Medicare Scorecard



## NY 2015 Medicaid & Commercial



# Introducing Scorecard on Payment Reform 2.0

The development and piloting of Scorecard 2.0 is funded by:




## GOALS:

- Help purchasers and other stakeholders in both the private and public sector **track the nation's and state's progress on payment reform.**
- Identify **high-level indicators of payment reform's impact** on the cost and quality of health care.

# Scorecard 2.0 Framework

A **multi-stakeholder advisory committee** provided input on measure selection




# Pilots in 3 States

CPR selected the states through a **RFP process** where organizations self-identified to sponsor the project locally.



NEW JERSEY  
HEALTH CARE  
QUALITY  
INSTITUTE



# Virginia Commercial Scorecard



The results of the Virginia Commercial Scorecard on Payment Reform are in, and 67% of all commercial payments are value-oriented—either tied to performance or designed to cut waste. Status-quo payments make up the remaining 33%. These data are from calendar year 2016 or the most recent 12 months.



Fee-for-Service (FFS) remains the dominant base method of payments to providers, even when the payment is value-oriented. Of all the value-oriented commercial payments health plans made in Virginia in 2016, 99% are still based on FFS. Only 1% use a non-FFS based payment method. Value-oriented payment methods categorized as non-FFS include: bundled payment, full capitation, partial or condition-specific capitation, and payment for non-visit functions, while pay-for-performance, shared savings, and shared risk rely on FFS.



Very few value-oriented payments put providers at risk. About 89% of value-oriented payments offer providers a financial upside only, with no downside financial risk.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Virginia Commercial Scorecard on Payment Reform 2.0 was made possible by the Laura & John Arnold Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, as well as the leadership of the Virginia Center for Health Innovation and the Virginia Association of Health Plans. CPR thanks Beth Bortz, President & CEO of VCH and Doug Gray, Executive Director of VAHP. CPR project leads Andrea Caballero and Alejandra Vargas-Johnson; CPR staff Lea Tesitore and Roslyn Murray, as well as the health plans that provided data for the Scorecard for their significant contributions to this project.

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## 2018 VIRGINIA SCORECARD ON Commercial Payment Reform

Use of Fee-For-Service in Value-Oriented Payments in Virginia



Share of Value-Oriented Payments that Put Providers at Financial Risk



Provider Participation in Value-Oriented Payments

**80%** of all hospital payments (in-patient)

**47%** of all specialist payments

**45%** of all primary care provider payments are value-oriented

Share of Total Dollars Paid to Primary Care Providers and Specialists

**69%**  
Paid annually to specialists

**31%**  
Paid annually to PCPs

AT RISK  
NOT AT RISK

FULL CAPITATION **0.0%**

**0.1%** OTHER

NON-VISIT FUNCTIONS **0.1%**

PARTIAL OR CONDITION SPECIFIC CAPITATION **0.1%**

BUNDLED PAYMENT **0.5%**

SHARED RISK **6.8%**

**26.0%**  
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE



**33.7%**  
SHARED SAVINGS

**67.3%**  
of the total payments made to providers are value-oriented.



# Virginia Commercial Scorecard


## Economic Signals



## System Transformation




## Outcomes



## Payment Reform's Impact at a Macro-Level: Leading Indicators to Watch

Together, these metrics shed light on the impact of payment reform on the health care system in Virginia.

### HBA1C TESTING



### HEALTH-RELATED QUALITY OF LIFE




### UNMET CARE DUE TO COST




### SHARED RISK CONTRACTS



### HOME RECOVERY INSTRUCTIONS



### CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS



### HOSPITAL-ACQUIRED PRESSURE ULCERS



### CONTROLLING HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE



Source: AHRQ, analysis by VHI. \*\* See Methodology for details.

Source: NCOA. \*Based on VA's case mix. See Methodology for details.

# Continued Evaluation and Transparency is Critical

## E.g. CPR's Standard Plan ACO Report

- Nutrition label-format provides purchasers with a standard, easy way to identify the value of their health plans' ACO arrangements.
- Meaningful and comprehensive cost, quality and utilization metrics help purchasers assess whether care is improving, staying the same, or getting worse.

### Standard Plan ACO Report

ACO Facts: Purchaser			
To the extent possible, all information should be specific to the purchaser-customer requesting the report. Reference the "Definitions" tab as needed.			
Name of Administrator: _____			
Current Period: [month, year] through [month, year]			
Administrator _____ # _____			
Total current members assigned or attributed to an ACO # _____			
Percent of current members assigned or attributed to an ACO #VALUE!			
Cost	Prior Period	Current Period	
Total per member per month spend for non-attributed/non-assigned members (specify if includes/excludes Rx)	\$	\$	
Total per member per month spend for attributed/assigned members (specify if includes/excludes Rx)	\$	\$	
Total cost of care (health care spend of ACOs)	\$	\$	
Total savings produced or overspending (gross gains or losses)	(+/-)	(+/-)	
Total gains or losses shared with ACOs	(+/-)	(+/-)	
Total per member per month savings or losses generated from participating in the ACO	#VALUE!	#VALUE!	
Total non-visit related payments charged to Company (e.g., infrastructure, management fees, quality incentives)	\$	\$	




### Based on the Nutrition Label





# But Don't Forget the Prices - They Matter Too

Factors accounting for growth in personal health care expenditures, selected calendar years 1990–2025



Sean P. Keenan et al. Health Aff 2017;published online

©2017 by Project HOPE - The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

HealthAffairs

- Provider consolidation has been driving up prices
- Consolidation will continue
- Prices have no correlation to quality of care
- High prices can negate positive impacts of reform

# But Don't Forget the Prices

## - They Matter Too

### States are Taking Action

- Using Medicare as a reference point for pricing
- State purchasers have volume to pursue this approach
- Commercial purchasers are likely to have interest as well




[https://khn.org/news/holy-cow-moment-changes-how-montanas-state-health-plan-does-business/?utm\\_campaign=KHN%3A%20First%20Edition&utm\\_source=hs\\_email&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_content=63899645&\\_hsenc=p2ANqtz--XqDFBzZeQW4sOiEy0x5mD9Eta296DchNyWTFiPPr8OW6aWsZqAiill\\_AwAjHyyc3ocdZCmM8bvafMgHCMerWWOvJksA&\\_hsmi=63899645](https://khn.org/news/holy-cow-moment-changes-how-montanas-state-health-plan-does-business/?utm_campaign=KHN%3A%20First%20Edition&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=63899645&_hsenc=p2ANqtz--XqDFBzZeQW4sOiEy0x5mD9Eta296DchNyWTFiPPr8OW6aWsZqAiill_AwAjHyyc3ocdZCmM8bvafMgHCMerWWOvJksA&_hsmi=63899645)  
[https://www.thepilot.com/business/state-health-plan-launches-new-provider-reimbursement-effort/article\\_1a31dbf6-c7f3-11e8-bb85-6bdba81c9f16.html](https://www.thepilot.com/business/state-health-plan-launches-new-provider-reimbursement-effort/article_1a31dbf6-c7f3-11e8-bb85-6bdba81c9f16.html)

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# Benefit Design

# High-Value Benefit Designs are Taking Off



High-value benefit designs encourage consumers to seek care from providers at the intersection of high-quality and low-cost.


26% of employers reduce out of pocket costs for **use of high-value services** supported by evidence.\*

43% of employers increase out of pocket costs for **services that are overused**.\*

9% of employers require higher cost share for certain services if **employees do not seek 2<sup>nd</sup> opinions**.\*

\*2017 Willis Towers Watson Best Practices in Health Care Employer Survey

# Evidence that Innovative Benefit Designs Work




High-value benefit designs encourage consumers to seek care from providers at the intersection of high-quality and low-cost.

Walmart's COE for spine surgery reduced inappropriate surgeries - 50% of associates referred for surgery were not good candidates.\*

\*<https://www.catalyze.org/product/centers-of-excellence-walmart-employer/>



# Evidence that Innovative Benefit Designs Work



High-value benefit designs encourage consumers to seek care from providers at the intersection of high-quality and low-cost.

CalPERS reference pricing for total joint replacement reduced average price by 26% and reduced selection of high-priced providers by 34%.\*

\*James Robinson and Timothy Brown "Increases In Consumer Cost Sharing Redirect Patient Volumes And Reduce Hospital Prices For Orthopedic Surgery," Health Affairs (August 2013) <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2013.0188> at 1393-96; David Cowling "CalPERS Reference Pricing Program for Hip or Knee Replacement," CalPERS Presentation (November 18, 2013) [http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/DAVID\\_COWLING\\_PRESENTATION\\_5U.pdf](http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/DAVID_COWLING_PRESENTATION_5U.pdf).




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# Network Design

# Provider Network Designs Are Also Taking Off

A high-value provider network is a select group of in-network providers in a given health plan.



**PROVIDER:** Agrees to deliver care at lower negotiated rates.

**PAYER:** Makes provider “in-network” giving provider increased patient volume.

13% of purchasers offer **high-performance provider networks**; that number could rise to 56% by 2018.


31% of employers are **using COEs**; that number could grow to 73% by 2018.

22% of employers have **onsite or near-site health centers**; that number could grow to 40% by 2018.

# Evidence that Innovative Provider Network Designs Work

- Consumers enrolled in narrow network products offered by a large payer in the **southeastern U.S.** had lower mean outpatient out-of-pocket expenditures and **10 percent lower premiums than individuals in the broad network plan.\***

Narrow networks use cost and sometimes quality criteria to select providers from a broader provider network.



\*Emily Gillen, et al. "The Effect of Narrow Network Plans on Out-of-Pocket Cost," American Journal of Managed Care (September 19, 2017)  
<https://www.ajmc.com/journals/issue/2017/2017-vol23-n9/the-effect-of-narrow-network-plans-on-out-of-pocket-cost>  
at 540-545, 542-543

# Evidence that Innovative Provider Network Designs Work

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## Group Insurance Commission in MA:

- Enrollees in narrow networks **spent 36% less.\***
- Tiered networks **reduced market share** of poorly performing providers by 12%. \*\*

## BCBS of MA:

- Tiered network **reduced total adjusted medical spending per member per quarter by 5%.\*\*\***

\*Jonathan Gruber and Robin McKnight “Controlling Health Care Costs Through Limited Network Insurance Plans: Evidence from Massachusetts State Employees,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20462 (September 2014) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w20462.pdf> at 4, 21, 23-24.

\*\*Anna Sinaiko and Meredith Rosenthal “The Impact of Tiered Physician Networks on Patient Choice,” Health Services Research (August 2014) <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4239853/> at 1350-51, 1355-56.

Anna Sinaiko, Mary Beth Landrum, Michael Chernew “Enrollment In A Health Plan With A Tiered Provider Network Decreased Medical Spending By 5 Percent,” Health Affairs (May 2017). <https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/abs/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1087?journalCode=hlthaff> at 870, 873-74.

# Americans Willing to Make Trade-Offs...For Now

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As the health system pushes Americans to become smarter shoppers, consumers may look closely at network offerings.

For example: Qualcomm Incorporated introduced a new ACO narrow network product in San Diego and had **significantly higher enrollment than expected**.\*

\*See case study to be released 3/5/19 at [www.catalyze.org](http://www.catalyze.org)

## Consider this:

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- Americans willing to make tradeoffs, but could become skeptical
- Given that many plans don't consider quality...
- Transparency on quality and prices will be essential

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# Options for the Future

# Effective Strategies for the Future?



**Push for price and quality transparency because it creates competition among providers and supports innovative benefit and provider network designs.**



**Introduce new benefit designs that encourage employees to use high-value providers**

- Reference pricing
- Centers of excellence



**Customize provider network designs based on value.**


- Narrow network
- Tiered network
- Direct contracting for ACO or episodes/procedures
- Onsite/near-site clinics



# Effective Strategies for the Future?



Pay providers differently through **alternative payment methods** that hold them responsible for quality and spending.



Encourage **new entrants into the market** to compete.

- Telehealth
- Onsite/near-site clinics
- Retail clinics, urgent care centers, etc.



Take a new approach to pricing through contracting, such as using Medicare rates as a reference price

# THANK YOU

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